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# How to Sell in Cameroon’s High-Power-Distance Economy
- URL: https://www.bontehmagazine.com/how-to-sell-in-cameroons-high-power-distance-economy/
- Published: 2026-08-26T23:06:58.000Z
- Updated: 2026-08-26T23:06:58.000Z
- Description: Why hierarchy, status and relationships can determine how business gets done in Cameroon.
- Author: Asafor  Ndifor
- Tags: Business

In Cameroon, competence, good service, and a killer offer are not always the key to closing a deal. This is particularly true when the prospective client is a large corporation, government ministry, public institution or state-owned enterprise. In these markets, the quality of a service matters, but that’s not usually enough. Sometimes, the good product, service and price point lose the deal to reputation, access, titles, introductions, appearances and the delicate question of who knows whom.

The businessman with the polished office, impressive title and photograph beside an important person begins the conversation based on assumed credibility and inferred importance, while the entrepreneur with a better solution but no visible institutional pedigree begins with explanations. One is presumed competent until proven otherwise. The other must perform competence repeatedly, preferably while smiling.

This is what it means to sell in a high-power-distance society.

[Power distance](https://www.theculturefactor.com/country-comparison-tool?ref=bontehmagazine.com) describes the extent to which people within a society or organisation expect and accept the unequal distribution of power. In a high-power-distance environment, hierarchy is not merely an organisational arrangement. It affects who may speak, whose opinion carries weight, who can make a decision, and whose presence is considered important.

Cameroon’s business environment displays these characteristics clearly. Authority is concentrated at the top of many organisations. Titles matter. Decisions that appear operational may still require executive approval. Junior employees may recognise the value of a service without having the power or confidence to champion it. Relationships with powerful people act as signals of legitimacy, and access to decision-makers is often distributed through personal and professional networks. As a result, selling services in Cameroon is not simply a competition between solutions. It is also a competition between signals of importance.

## **Social proof as marketing**

Selling a service requires the buyer to believe in something that cannot be completely inspected in advance. A company buying computers can examine the machines. A ministry buying vehicles can inspect the vehicles. A corporation buying consulting, software development, marketing, research or business-process support is purchasing a promise. It is buying the expectation that a group of people will eventually produce a valuable result. This initial uncertainty makes buyers search for signs of credibility: previous projects, references, certifications, demonstrations and evidence of performance.

In Cameroon, another set of questions often accompanies these reasonable enquiries. Who introduced you? Which major organisations have hired you? Where is your office? How many employees do you have? Which senior executive knows you? Are you sufficiently important for dealing with you to feel safe? Competence is usually filtered through status.

A young service company must do the work, prove that it can do the work, and construct the appearance of a company that has already been trusted to do much bigger work. It must become successful enough to deserve the opportunity that could make it successful. If a business is to be given a deal, it must first of all prove that it is big, or be sufficiently connected and liked by the powers that be in order to make the size, experience, and even competence irrelevant.

## **Why “fake it till you make it” thrives**

High-power-distance markets are the natural habitat of “fake it till you make it.” At its most harmless, the expression means displaying confidence before success has fully arrived. Business people act as though the company belongs in the room until the market finally agrees. At its worst, it means manufacturing the symbols of capacity without possessing the capacity itself.

When buyers rely heavily on status signals, presentation can outrun substance. A beautiful office may speak louder than a functional prototype. A borrowed connection may travel further than a strong portfolio. A company can appear large because appearing large is one of the conditions for receiving the contracts that would actually make it large. And in the most insidious circumstances, proximity to power may just decide everything, even to the extent of dismissing competence. 

The businesspeople who understand the game early invest in the theatre of business. There are grand titles, suits, photographs, associations, strategic friendships, and offices with conference rooms that spend most of the week empty. Businesspeople who do not understand it spend the same money on engineers, equipment, training, and product quality. Both businesspeople may enter the same sales meeting, and the better-costumed company will look like a safer bet, irrespective of their price point. They will benefit from an assumption of confidence. Sometimes, depending on the connections and ties a businessperson may have, the sales process will be a lot easier. No competition, just political affiliation

However, this is not always the result of vanity or corruption. Institutional buyers are often risk-averse. The employee recommending an unfamiliar vendor may receive little reward if the project succeeds and considerable blame if it fails. Choosing an established, well-connected or visibly important provider becomes a form of personal insurance. “No one will question this choice” defeats “this is the best choice.”

Every new business choosing Cameroon as their destination must recognise this without surrendering to it. The lesson is not to become fraudulent. It is to make competence visible in a language the market already understands.

### **Sell trust before selling the service**

In a low-trust market, the first product is credibility.

A service provider should not enter an important meeting with only an idea and enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is pleasant, but it is difficult to attach to a purchase order.

The seller needs proof:

- A working demonstration
- A specific case study
- References from recognisable clients
- Testimonials that describe measurable results
- A clear delivery process
- Professional documentation
- A team whose qualifications are easy to verify
- Evidence that the business can complete the assignment

For a young company without major clients, smaller projects become extremely valuable. A modest assignment completed successfully can provide the evidence required to win a larger one. Founders should therefore treat early clients not only as sources of revenue but as sources of institutional credibility.

The work must be documented. “We helped a company improve its operations” is a claim. “We reduced its processing time from three days to four hours” is evidence.

Cameroonian service businesses must learn to package their competence. Good work hidden inside the founder’s laptop has little commercial value. It needs a name, a case study, a testimonial and, if possible, a number attached to it.

## **Power is a moat**

Corporations have procurement policies, vendor-registration procedures and evaluation committees, but corporations do not make decisions. People do.

Selling to a large organisation requires several different victories. The operational team must believe the service solves a problem. The technical team must believe it can work. Procurement must accept the vendor. Finance must approve the expenditure. Senior management must consider the project important enough to support. Most importantly, somebody inside the organisation must care enough to keep moving the proposal.

A common mistake is confusing interest with authority. A junior manager may love the solution and still have no power to buy it. The business can spend months giving demonstrations, revising proposals and attending cheerful meetings without speaking to the person who controls the budget or makes the decisions

The meeting was successful. Everyone was impressed. Nothing happened.

Before investing heavily in a corporate sale, the service provider must answer five questions:

1. Who is directly affected by the problem?
2. Who controls the relevant budget?
3. Who approves new vendors?
4. Who can prevent the purchase?
5. Who has enough influence to champion the solution internally?

The person experiencing the problem may not be the person empowered to solve it. In a high-power-distance organisation, this distinction is decisive.

A seller therefore needs two relationships: one with the user who understands the problem and another with the authority who can approve the solution.

## **Use introductions as transfers of trust**

Cold outreach is not useless in Cameroon, but warm introductions are significantly more powerful.

An introduction from a respected person does more than secure a meeting. It transfers credibility. The person making the introduction lends part of their reputation to the seller and lowers the perceived risk of engagement.

This is why relationships matter. However, relationship-building should not be confused with collecting telephone numbers from powerful people or taking photographs at conferences.

A useful business relationship is built through repeated evidence of seriousness. It comes from sharing useful information, making thoughtful introductions, contributing to professional communities, completing small assignments well, and remaining visible long enough to become familiar.

The objective is not to know everybody. It is to become trusted by the people whose trust travels. The people who have power, influence, and can make systems move in the directions they want

Founders should deliberately cultivate relationships with industry professionals, past clients, consultants, association leaders and senior managers who understand the value of their work. These people can provide market intelligence, referrals and legitimacy. Most importantly, be familiar with the decision-makers and those who whisper to them. Sometimes that’s the only real requirement.

In Cameroon, competence can open some doors. But connections to power open them faster and keep them open longer

  
**Learn the institution’s internal language**

A proposal may describe an excellent solution and still fail because it does not speak to the institution’s priorities.

A bank does not merely want innovative software. It wants software that meets security, compliance, integration and reporting requirements. A ministry does not simply want a better service. It needs an intervention that fits a budget line, procurement category, administrative process and public objective. Service providers must therefore learn how the buyer justifies purchases internally.

The proposal should show:

- The precise institutional problem
- The operational or financial cost of leaving it unresolved
- The expected result
- The implementation process
- The relevant risks and safeguards
- The cost and payment structure
- The evidence that the provider can deliver
- The internal objective or policy the project supports

This changes the seller’s position. The company is no longer asking the buyer to take a chance; it is helping someone inside the institution defend a sensible decision. The best proposal is not simply persuasive to the person reading it. It is easy for that person to carry upstairs.

## **Government sales require administrative competence**

Selling to government institutions adds formal procurement to hierarchy.

Cameroon’s public-contracting framework is governed by the[ Public Contracts Code](https://www.armp.cm/decrets?ref=bontehmagazine.com), instituted by Decree No. 2018/366 of 20 June 2018\. The government has also developed the[ Cameroon Online E-Procurement System](https://www.minmap.cm/index.php?Itemid=175&id=63&lang=fr&option=com%5Fcontent&view=article&ref=bontehmagazine.com), known as COLEPS, to support electronic procurement.

These systems create formal procedures for advertising opportunities, submitting bids, evaluating suppliers and awarding contracts. They also mean that technical ability alone is insufficient.

A supplier must understand where opportunities are published, how tender documents are prepared, which administrative and tax documents are required, how eligibility conditions are interpreted, how bids are evaluated and how contract execution is documented.

The company may be technically qualified to complete an assignment and administratively unqualified to win it.

Public institutions do not buy only the service. They buy the documentation surrounding the service. An excellent engineer can lose to an average competitor with a better tender file. It may be painful, but pain is not one of the evaluation criteria.

The Ministry of Public Contracts describes COLEPS and related procurement tools as mechanisms for improving the[ predictability, visibility and transparency](https://www.minmap.cm/index.php?Itemid=146&catid=10&id=83%3Aprojet-coleps-2&lang=en&option=com%5Fcontent&view=article&ref=bontehmagazine.com) of public contracting. Service firms that want government business must learn to use these systems instead of depending entirely on rumours about available contracts.

They must also prepare for the financing burden. Staff, suppliers and taxes may need to be paid before the institution pays the contractor. A business can win a prestigious contract, execute it successfully and still suffer a cash-flow crisis. The contract becomes both a trophy and a hostage situation.

Before bidding, a company must calculate the cost of tender preparation, guarantees, compliance, execution and delayed payment. Revenue that arrives too late can behave remarkably like no revenue at all.

  
**Enter through smaller doors**

The unknown service provider should not always attempt to win the largest available contract.

High-power-distance systems reward existing credibility, so the practical strategy is to accumulate it.

Pilot projects, limited assignments, subcontracting arrangements and consortiums allow younger companies to establish references without carrying the full risk of a major contract. Partnering with an established provider can also give a new firm access to procurement knowledge, institutional relationships and larger projects.

The arrangement must, however, be negotiated carefully. Small companies should protect their payment terms, responsibilities, intellectual property and right to cite the completed work. Otherwise, they may execute the project while the larger partner collects the money, the recognition and the commemorative photograph.

There is no shame in entering through a smaller door. Once inside, doors become easier to locate.

## **Build products where promises are weak**

For first-time technology entrepreneurs, building and shipping a product may be more effective than beginning with an entirely service-based business.

A service proposal asks the buyer to imagine competence. A working product allows the buyer to encounter it.

A customer can test an application, inspect a platform or observe actual transactions. Usage, retention, and measurable results become evidence independent of the founder’s status. The conversation changes from “Trust us to build this” to “Here is what we have built.”

Products can also spread from below. Individual workers or smaller businesses may begin using a tool before a large institution approves an organisation-wide contract. Adoption creates internal demand and gives the founder leverage that a cold proposal cannot.

  
Products do not eliminate procurement, compliance or hierarchy. Enterprise software will eventually meet all three, possibly in the same meeting. But a product gives the underdog something that status finds harder to dismiss: visible traction.

## **Look established, but become substantial**

The practical response to a high-power-distance market is not to pretend to be what the company is not. It is to remove unnecessary signs of risk.

A small business can still present itself professionally. It can maintain accurate records, produce excellent proposals, respond promptly, define its processes, clarify its pricing and communicate confidently. It can assemble an advisory board, work with credible partners and make its achievements visible.

There is a difference between signalling competence and inventing it.

The founder does not need to rent an expensive office to appear serious. The founder needs a business that behaves seriously. Professionalism should be operational before it becomes decorative.

The goal is to look credible because the company is credible.

## **The market behind the market**

Selling services in Cameroon is rarely a simple exchange between a buyer with a problem and a provider with a solution.

Behind the visible market is another market in which businesses trade in reputation, proximity, familiarity, and perceived importance. Competence matters, but competence doesn’t always give access. Status, affiliation, and perceived power can sometimes be the only way competence gets the opportunity to prove itself.

Founders who ignore this reality can spend years wondering why good work is not enough. Founders who surrender entirely to it may become better at displaying success than delivering value.

The difficult task is to understand the game without becoming its worst player.

Build relationships, find the real decision-maker, learn procurement, package competence, accumulate references, enter through smaller contracts, manage cash flow, and build products where products can prove what promises cannot.

Above all, make it easy for institutions to trust the business without requiring the business to manufacture a false identity, because even in high-power-distance markets, one day the cocks come home to roost

  
**Appendix A: Sources**

1. **Asafor, Emmanuel.**[ “In the Throes”](https://medium.com/@emmanuelasafor/in-the-throes-b09a3dd4c916?ref=bontehmagazine.com). Primary conceptual source for the article’s analysis of service entrepreneurship and selling within a high-power-distance business environment.
2. **The Culture Factor Group.**[ Country Comparison Tool and definition of power distance](https://www.theculturefactor.com/country-comparison-tool?ref=bontehmagazine.com). Power distance is defined as the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organisations expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.
3. **Agence de Régulation des Marchés Publics.**[ Decree No. 2018/366 of 20 June 2018 instituting Cameroon’s Public Contracts Code](https://www.armp.cm/decrets?ref=bontehmagazine.com).
4. **Ministry of Public Contracts.**[ Definition of the Cameroon Online E-Procurement System](https://www.minmap.cm/index.php?Itemid=175&id=63&lang=fr&option=com%5Fcontent&view=article&ref=bontehmagazine.com).
5. **Ministry of Public Contracts.**[ COLEPS and public-procurement programming](https://www.minmap.cm/index.php?Itemid=146&catid=10&id=83%3Aprojet-coleps-2&lang=en&option=com%5Fcontent&view=article&ref=bontehmagazine.com).
6. **World Bank Group.**[ Enterprise Surveys](https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys?ref=bontehmagazine.com). The surveys collect firm-level information on business conditions, including finance, corruption, infrastructure, competition and interactions with government.

## **Appendix B: Acronyms**

- **COLEPS:** Cameroon Online E-Procurement System.